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The Interplay of Competition and Cooperation 
ABSTRACT 
Research streams on competition and cooperation are central to the field of strategic 
management but have evolved independently. The emerging literature on coopetition has 
brought attention to the phenomenon of simultaneous competition and cooperation, yet the 
interplay between the two has remained under-researched. We offer a roadmap for studying 
this interplay, which identifies some of its antecedents and consequences, highlights debates 
concerning the nature of competition and cooperation and the association between the two, 
and directs attention to the tension between competition and cooperation and the alternative 
approaches for managing this tension. We discuss the broader implications of the interplay, 
note some intriguing open questions, offer directions for future research, and present an 
organizing framework for the interplay of competition and cooperation.   
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The Interplay of Competition and Cooperation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The research streams on competition and cooperation have different origins and have evolved 
independently from one another. Traditionally, strategy research has focused on the study of 
interfirm competition. Competition can be defined as the pursuit of a market position by 
firms that offer comparable products to a targeted set of customers. Following industrial 
organization economics, strategy research has related profitability to industry structure and to 
firms’ positions in product markets (Porter, 1980). Subsequently, the resource-based view has 
emphasized firms’ idiosyncratic resource configurations and competition in factor markets 
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Research on competitive dynamics has elaborated on the 
implications of the frequency, aggressiveness, complexity, and diversity of firms’ 
competitive actions for the behavior of their competitors (Chen, 1996; Smith, Ferrier, and 
Ndofor, 2001). Finally, research on multimarket competition has suggested that market 
overlap creates mutual deterrence that restricts competitive interaction, thereby fostering 
cooperation in the form of tacit collusion (Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Yu and Cannella, 2013). 
Hence, research that has assumed the competitive logic implies that competitive interactions 
among firms shape their performance, while implicitly or explicitly considering interfirm 
cooperation as a form of collusion that mitigates competition and can restrict economic 
welfare (e.g., Tirole, 1988). Cooperation has thus been largely viewed unfavorably by this 
tradition (e.g., Tong and Reuer, 2010).  
In parallel, research on cooperation has alluded to firms pursuing common or at least 
compatible goals while sharing and exchanging resources and engaging in joint activities. 
Cooperative interfirm relations, including strategic alliances, joint ventures, and research 
consortia, have gained prominence and drawn increasing attention from scholars. Early work 
has been mostly phenomenon-driven in studying international joint ventures and applying a 
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transaction-cost economics perspective (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988), with later work 
incorporating also resource-based and relational views (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Scholars have 
investigated the motivations for forming cooperative relations as well as topics related to 
partner selection, alliance management and governance, and the performance implications of 
alliances (Wassmer, 2010). This stream of research has suggested that alliances and networks 
of cooperative relations directly contribute to firm performance rather than merely constrain 
rivalry (Gulati, 1998; Shipilov, Li, and Greve, 2011). Nevertheless, this emerging literature 
on cooperation has evolved almost independently of the literature on competition. Early 
research on cooperation has contrasted cooperative relations with competition and considered 
cooperative agreements as a hybrid form of governance that economizes on transaction costs 
while serving as a vehicle for implementing corporate growth strategies. Scholars have since 
begun to acknowledge that cooperation can create value and enhance firm performance. 
Implicit in this research has been the assumption that firms engage in cooperation in order to 
access their partners’ knowledge, resources, and capabilities. Accordingly, competitive 
tension with alliance partners has been considered hazardous since it could undermine 
cooperation, restrict resource exchange, and destabilize alliances (Das and Teng, 2000). 
Hence, until recently, scholars studying competition or cooperation have followed distinct 
logics, portraying the other form of interaction unfavorably and making little theoretical or 
empirical effort to bring together these two streams of research. 
Competition and cooperation have traditionally been considered separate modes of 
interaction among firms, but scholars have begun to acknowledge that firms simultaneously 
engage in competition and cooperation with each other. For instance, when studying the 
antecedents of alliance formation, scholars have noted that competitive tension can facilitate 
alliance formation (e.g., Ang, 2008). Additionally, scholars investigating the competitive 
behaviors of partners in alliances have observed that opportunistic behavior and attention to 
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private benefits can influence cooperation in alliances (e.g., Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 
2000; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). Others have examined how partners seek to not 
only create but also capture value in alliances by competing for their share of the proceeds 
(Lavie, 2007; Ozmel et al., 2017). In horizontal alliances between competitors, some scholars 
have observed that learning races can evolve which result in knowledge leakage that alters 
the competitive position of a firm vis-à-vis its partner (Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). 
Finally, scholars have acknowledged that alliances formed by a firm’s rivals impose 
competitive pressure, in part due to foreclosed partnering opportunities, which in turn 
encourage the firm to form countervailing alliances with reputable rivals (Silverman and 
Baum, 2000, Gimeno, 2004). To describe the dynamics that arise in collaborations with 
competitors, scholars have alluded to the notion of ‘coopetition’ (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996).  
The emerging literature on coopetition has evolved as another distinct stream of 
research, focusing on the simultaneous cooperation and competition between firms. Whereas 
some scholars have defined coopetition at the dyad level (e.g., Bengtsson and Kock, 2000), 
others have studied it in industry networks (e.g., Gnyawali, He, and Madhavan, 2006). 
Research on coopetition has focused on its antecedents and consequences. Although some 
studies identify unique motivations for cooperating with competitors, such as convergence of 
technologies that loosens sector boundaries (Dagnino and Padula, 2002; Gnyawali and Park, 
2009), most studies identify antecedents such as risk reduction and cost sharing, which echo 
earlier research on alliance formation. Similarly, research on the implications of coopetition 
for innovation and performance underscores the merits of cooperation, echoing the literature 
on value creation in alliances, with only a few studies acknowledging some boundary 
conditions. Even though research on coopetition has made some strides in juxtaposing 
competition and cooperation, this fragmented literature has been struggling to reach 
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consensus concerning the definition and characteristics of this phenomenon (Bengtsson and 
Raza-Ullah, 2016; Bouncken et al., 2015; Dorn, Schweiger, and Albers, 2016).    
With the aforementioned exceptions, most of the accumulated research on 
cooperation has not been sufficiently integrated with literature on competition, and the 
interplay of competition and cooperation has remained under-researched. The notion of 
interplay refers both to how competition and cooperation interrelate and to their interaction in 
driving outcomes such as corporate behavior and performance. A tighter integration between 
these two research streams can enhance our understanding of the complex dynamics that 
characterize firms’ interactions in markets (Chen and Miller, 2015). Such integration may 
reveal how coopetitive interactions shape value creation and appropriation among firms. In 
fact, the interplay of competition and cooperation has implications that go beyond the 
distribution of value. For instance, scholars may study how competition drives cooperation 
and vice versa, look at how competition and cooperation jointly drive organizational 
outcomes such as innovation and firm performance, or identify tradeoffs and tensions that 
prevail between competition and cooperation at the firm and industry levels.  
The integration of research streams on competition and cooperation departs in 
important ways from the Special Issue on Strategic Networks (Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer, 
2000). Despite the thriving literature on alliance networks that followed the aforementioned 
special issue, scholars have so far devoted more attention to the cooperative context of 
interfirm collaboration and made less progress in crossing the apparent divide between the 
separate research streams on cooperation and competition. Although subsequent special 
issues have shed light on some other aspects of alliance networks by advancing social 
network theories (Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston, 2006), studying the evolution and 
dynamics of social networks (Ahuja, Soda, and Zaheer, 2012), or acknowledging relational 
pluralism and the multiplexity of network ties (Shipilov et al., 2014), these advancements 
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have not attempted to integrate research streams on competition and cooperation. Such an 
agenda is important for bringing together two of the most central bodies of research in the 
field of strategic management. 
We seek to foster research on the interplay of competition and cooperation by laying 
the foundations for an integrative framework that underscores the multifaceted nature of 
competition and cooperation. Both can be explicit or implicit and conceptualized as discrete 
choices or continuous activities. They can transpire in horizontal, vertical, or complementary 
value chain activities, and scholars can treat them as orthogonal types of interfirm relations or 
acknowledge the inherent tradeoffs and interdependencies between them. We proceed by 
discussing the environmental, organizational, and managerial antecedents of competition and 
cooperation. We then focus on several aspects of their interplay such as how firms manage to 
find the right balance in pursuing both competition and cooperation. We discuss the 
simultaneous pursuit of these activities versus a sequential transition between them. We also 
elaborate on the possibility of constraining versus reinforcing associations, whereby 
competition drives out cooperation or rather leads to cooperation between firms. We then 
explain the notions of bilateral versus multilateral competition and direct versus indirect 
competition and cooperation at different levels of analysis. We identify several types of 
tensions that prevail between competition and cooperation, relating to knowledge leakage, 
opportunistic behavior, lack of commitment, and instability of interfirm relations. These 
tensions shape value creation and appropriation and determine the distribution of common 
and private benefits to firms taking part in such relations. The broader implications relate to 
firms’ financial performance, innovation, survival, growth strategies, market entry, and 
strategic positioning. Finally, we discuss how firms can cope with these tensions by means of 
contextual integration or via organizational, temporal, or domain separation between 
competition and cooperation. These approaches offer alternative means to engage in both 
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competition and cooperation while mitigating the tension between these activities. We use the 
resulting roadmap to classify the articles in this special issue and highlight important areas for 
research on the interplay of competition and cooperation. 
TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE RESEARCH AGENDA 
Our review of the literature reveals five specific areas where further research is needed. One 
such area concerns the antecedents, processes, and consequences of cooperating with 
competitors. Scholars here might ask questions such as: How do organizational, 
environmental, and managerial factors such as cognitive biases drive coopetition? How do 
industry conditions and firms’ resource configurations shape coopetition? One interesting 
aspect of this theme relates to the means by which firms are able to simultaneously maintain 
and manage competitive and cooperative relations: Should they simultaneously cooperate and 
compete or should they specialize by separating their partners from their competitors? How 
can firms mitigate the risks of their partners’ opportunistic behavior when these partners are 
also their competitors? How do interfirm trust, joint governance, and routines emerge in 
coopetitive relations? These questions call for process-oriented research based on case studies 
that can support grounded theory development. A final set of questions in this area concerns 
the implications of the simultaneous pursuit of competition and cooperation. Here, scholars 
might explore questions such as: What are the various facets of coopetition and their 
respective performance implications? How does cooperation affect firms’ competitive 
positions? 
A second area for development concerns value creation and appropriation. Whereas 
cooperation has been traditionally related to the former and competition to the latter, further 
scrutiny may reveal an interdependence between common benefits that partners develop and 
share in their cooperation and private benefits that they independently extract from their 
alliances with competitors (Khanna et al., 1998). Some important questions in this area that 
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deserve scholarly attention are: How do firms simultaneously manage value creation and 
appropriation in their cooperative relations? What are the tradeoffs and challenges they 
encounter due to simultaneous competition and cooperation? Alliance managers may, for 
instance, find it challenging to share knowledge while cooperating with partners, knowing 
that such exchange might be exploited by their counterparts. Current research falls short of 
offering sufficient insights into how to strike a balance between knowledge sharing and 
knowledge protection in alliances with competitors.  
Whereas the above questions underscore causal associations and managerial 
perspectives, a third area of research highlights a temporal dimension relating to the dynamic 
interplay between competition and cooperation. Relevant questions in this regard include: 
How do competition and cooperation coevolve at the firm, dyad, network, and industry 
levels? How does competition elicit cooperation? How and why do alliance partners begin to 
compete? Although scholars have already demonstrated that the intensity of competition in an 
industry can affect the likelihood of cooperation (e.g., Ang, 2008) and have associated 
multimarket competition with alliance formation and partner selection (Amir, Lavie, and 
Hashai, forthcoming; Ryu, Brush, and Reuer, 2015), there is no consensus about the valence 
of these effects, thus creating a need to identify boundary conditions and examine how 
various aspects of competition shape alliance formation and partner selection. It is also 
interesting to study how alliances between competitors (competition precedes cooperation) 
differ from alliances that experience knowledge spillovers and the subsequent entry of one 
partner into the other’s domain (cooperation precedes competition). The implications for the 
competitive positions of the partners and the dynamics of their cooperation may vary in these 
two cases as well. 
A fourth area of research concerns firms’ capabilities and organization for supporting 
coopetition. Whereas research on alliances has offered some insights into alliance 
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management capabilities and the role of a dedicated organizational function in coordinating 
alliance activities (e.g., Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002), we know little about the unique 
capabilities required for managing the interplay of competition and cooperation. What are the 
elements of a coopetition capability? How do they differ from those of an alliance 
management capability? How is a coopetition capability developed and institutionalized? 
How does the alignment of the coopetition capabilities of the firm and its partner shape the 
performance of their collaboration? These are some of the questions that future research 
might explore. An additional set of questions concerns the means by which firms cope with 
the inherent tension between competition and cooperation.  
Finally, scholars may apply methods that have served for analyzing one type of 
relation to study the other. Most promising here is the use of network analysis, which is often 
applied for studying social networks (e.g., Ahuja, 2000) but can also serve for studying 
competition networks that are composed of competitive relations between firms. Scholars 
have begun to apply this method to study network properties such as structural holes in 
competition networks (Yamanoi, 2011) but the underlying assumption has been that the 
mechanisms that drive behavior in competition networks are similar to those applicable in 
social networks (Tsai, Su, and Chen, 2011). Future research could challenge this assumption 
and develop a theory for the evolution and performance implications of competition 
networks. The next step would then be to raise questions such as: How do competition 
networks drive the evolution of cooperation networks and vice versa? How does the interplay 
of competition networks and cooperation networks, which results in coopetition networks, 
shape firm performance and drive industry entry and exit? How do competitors of a firm’s 
partners or partners of a firm’s competitors influence its strategy and performance? Such 
questions call for a look beyond immediate dyadic relations. While some scholars have 
already begun to consider how alliances formed by competitors affect firm value (Oxley, 
10 
 
Sampson, and Silverman, 2009), and how firms respond to such alliances by forming 
countervailing alliances (Gimeno, 2004), further work is needed to advance this promising 
line of inquiry. Other methodologies, including experiments and simulations, may offer 
further opportunities to advance our understanding of this interplay. It is evident that these 
promising avenues for research on the interplay of competition and cooperation go beyond 
current research on coopetition. We hope that our special issue will pave the way for this 
emerging research agenda and stimulate research that can address these important research 
questions.   
A PRELIMINARY ROADMAP FOR STUDYING THE INTERPLAY 
Now that we have identified several areas for developing research on the interplay of 
competition and cooperation, we will begin to outline a roadmap for such research. The 
purpose of this roadmap is to point to some important aspects of the phenomenon and offer 
guidance for answering some of the most essential research questions raised in the previous 
section.     
The nature and interplay of competition and cooperation 
Research on coopetition consistently alludes to simultaneous competition and cooperation, 
yet treats these activities ambivalently. One stream of research maintains that competition 
and cooperation are contradictory activities (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000), while another 
underscores their complementary nature (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). Although both 
perspectives describe a valid possibility, the interplay of competition and cooperation holds 
various other possibilities. Rather than merely juxtaposing the two, we allude to their 
multifaceted nature and consider their interdependencies in a more nuanced manner.   
 One consideration is whether competition and cooperation are explicit or implicit. 
Research on coopetition often assumes that both competition and cooperation are explicit, 
i.e., that firms operate in each other’s product markets and cooperate via interfirm alliances 
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(Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). Nevertheless, competition can take many forms besides overlap 
in product markets, such as similarity between firms’ resource bases and perceived rivalry 
(Chen, 1996). Resource similarity does not necessarily entail explicit competition, yet offers 
straightforward opportunities to initiate it in the (near) future (Barney, 1991). Perceived 
rivalry might entail no overlap in the product market or resource market, yet implicit 
competition of this kind can drive managers’ decisions to initiate competitive actions and is 
thus consequential (Porac and Thomas, 1990). The notion of implicit competition suggests 
that competition can be subjective and socially constructed. The distinction between implicit 
and explicit interaction also applies to cooperation. Research on cooperation acknowledges 
various forms of collaboration, some of which involve a formal agreement and joint 
organizational structure, whereas others remain informal or even implicit. A joint venture is 
an explicit form of collaboration with a standalone organizational hierarchy, governance 
structure, and formal commitments by the partners. In turn, price fixing and other forms of 
collusion between competitors or coordination among members of an industry association or 
technological platform represent implicit cooperation that can be just as consequential as 
explicit cooperation via formal alliances (Bertrand and Lumineau, 2016; Kapoor and 
McGrath, 2014). Hence, when studying the interplay of competition and cooperation, one 
should consider the distinctive implications of different – explicit or implicit – configurations 
of competition and cooperation. 
 The nature of the relationships among firms is also defined by the configuration of 
their value chain activities. Competition and cooperation can take place in the horizontal 
dimension among firms that operate in the same industry sector. They can also occur in the 
vertical dimension of the supply chain between buyers and suppliers that simultaneously 
collaborate while competing for margins or more directly by means of tapered integration 
(Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005). Competition and cooperation can emerge among 
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firms with complementary businesses that cooperate and compete as part of an ecosystem 
(Ansari, Garud, and Kumaraswamy, 2016; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). At a higher resolution, 
competition and cooperation can play out in product markets via price competition or price 
setting, advertising, and promotion as well as in resource markets when firms cooperate or 
compete for employees, technical knowledge, or government support. They also can play out 
in market entry decisions as firms welcome or resist each other’s market reconfiguration 
attempts as a function of their prior social ties (Han, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017).  
 Another assumption in the study of competition and cooperation concerns the valence 
of their association. According to one tradition, which is anchored in game theory, firms can 
decide how much to compete or cooperate with each other (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1996). This choice assumes that competition and cooperation are discrete alternatives that 
invoke inconsistent corporate behaviors. This tradition is also evident in some research on 
markets for ideas and technologies (e.g., Gans and Stern, 2003). One critique of this 
overarching approach is that a firm may have no choice once its alliance partner decides to 
enter its market. It is thus worth considering the implications of being the firm that initiates 
versus the firm that reacts to such a unilateral decision. Furthermore, because firms may 
simultaneously compete and cooperate with each other, the decision relates to the extent of 
their continuous cooperation and competition. Firms can maintain weak or strong cooperative 
ties as well as different levels of market overlap. Although this latter perspective recognizes 
the continuous natures of competition and cooperation, it treats them as orthogonal. Hence, it 
does not acknowledge the inherent tradeoffs between their respective corporate behaviors, 
which would suggest a negative association between them. Even when scholars acknowledge 
that competition can undermine cooperation, the issue of the appropriate balance between 
competition and cooperation remains. A certain market overlap between alliance partners can 
facilitate innovation (e.g., Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013) but excessive overlap 
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could destabilize the alliance between the parties (e.g., Bouncken and Friedrich, 2012). 
Hence, scholars should study the environmental and organizational conditions that influence 
the desirable balance point between competition and cooperation as well as the processes that 
enable firms to strive for such balance as opposed to specializing in a dominant activity, be it 
competition or cooperation. Thus, competition and cooperation should not be treated as 
discrete choices, and the tradeoffs between them should be taken into account.  
 Furthermore, the literature on coopetition underscores simultaneous competition and 
cooperation, thus overlooking an important temporal dimension. Even if simultaneous 
competition and cooperation is assumed, a distinction can be made between alliance partners 
that enter each other’s product markets and begin to compete and long-time rivals that initiate 
a joint alliance. In the case of the former, competition “pollutes” cooperation, while in the 
latter, cooperation “pollutes” a competitive relation. Scholars may study the implications of 
the distinctive scenarios by which coopetition emerges. For instance, trust building in 
alliances between long-time rivals (Gnyawali and Park, 2011) may be more challenging than 
instituting safeguards against opportunistic behavior of long-time partners (Kale et al., 2000). 
Also of interest is the transition from competition to cooperation and vice versa. Such 
sequential coopetition entails a lack of simultaneous competition and cooperation. Instead, 
competitors may decide over time to become suppliers of general purpose technologies and 
collaborate with their former competitors by means of division of labor in the market (Conti, 
Gambardella, and Novelli, forthcoming). Likewise, a partner may opt to discontinue its 
alliance with the firm before introducing a competing product line (Das and Teng, 2000). 
Scholars may compare the scenario whereby competition precedes cooperation to that of 
cooperation preceding competition. The transition between competition and cooperation 
could also be driven by the dynamics of industry evolution rather than by considerations at 
the dyad level. Overall, the temporal dimension has so far not received much attention in 
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extant research.  
 Thus far we have assumed that there are inherent tradeoffs between competition and 
cooperation. This suggests a constraining association whereby competition drives out 
cooperation and vice versa. An alternative approach suggests that the association between 
competition and cooperation can be reinforcing. In a learning alliance, for example, 
cooperation can result in knowledge leakage that enables a firm to build independent 
capabilities and enter into competition with its former partner in a subsequent period (Hamel, 
1991). Similarly, intense competition between rivals may encourage them to favor 
cooperation as a superior alternative (Ang, 2008; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). In 
responding to competitive pressure, firms may decide to form alliances not only with their 
immediate rivals but also with the partners of their rivals or with other prospective partners 
that can counterbalance the competitive pressure imposed by their competitors (Gimeno, 
2004; Silverman and Baum, 2002). These observations suggest that while competition 
attenuates cooperation at a given point in time, their association can be reinforcing over time, 
i.e., competition would prompt cooperation, which in turn may foster competition.  
 These observations also hint at another aspect of competition and cooperation, whose 
interplay can take place at different levels. Whereas most prior research has focused on 
coopetition at the dyad level, some scholars have studied it in a firm-centric alliance portfolio 
(e.g., Lavie, 2007), in a multi-party alliance (e.g., Lavie, Lechner, and Singh, 2007), in 
ecosystems (e.g., Henderson and Gawer 2007), or at the industry level (e.g., Gambardella and 
McGahan, 2010; Gnyawali and Park, 2011). While these can all be considered instances of 
network coopetition (Dagnino and Padula, 2002), their underlying dynamics are distinct. In 
an alliance portfolio, for instance, the focal firm can attempt to manage competitive tension 
by selecting partners and assigning different roles to competing partners (Lavie and Singh, 
2012). However, in a multi-party alliance, such decisions must be reached in agreement with 
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other members of the alliance (Lavie et al., 2007). In ecosystems, the firm depends on the 
independent decisions of other members that serve the same technological platform 
(Henderson and Gawer, 2007). A case in point is the cooperation between Google and 
Samsung on the Android platform, which does not preclude competition between these firms 
in the handset market. Interestingly, the interplay of competition and cooperation can 
transpire not only within such platforms but also across platforms.  
Nonetheless, a distinction can be made between bilateral and multilateral interplay. A 
bilateral interplay involves only two firms that simultaneously compete and cooperate with 
each other. A multilateral interplay involves third parties. For instance, a firm may cooperate 
with multiple alliance partners that compete with each other rather than with the focal firm 
(e.g., Lavie, 2007). It may also compete indirectly with another firm by virtue of their 
independent cooperation with the same alliance partners (Gimeno, 2004; Ryu, McCann, and 
Reuer, forthcoming). Accordingly, scholars should study the distinction between the direct 
and indirect interplay of competition and cooperation at multiple levels of analysis. All in all, 
the nature of this interplay is richer and more complex than has been previously assumed and 
thus merits further investigation.   
Antecedents and consequences of interplay 
Research on coopetition explains firms’ motivations for entering alliances with their direct 
competitors despite the expected competitive tension. These motivational antecedents are tied 
to environmental conditions such as the emergence or convergence of technologies, shortened 
product life cycles, and reduced costs and risks, which are typical of knowledge-intensive 
industries (Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson, and Kock, 2014). Another 
condition includes the decline or maturity of an industry, which intensifies competitive 
pressure and in turn induces cooperation (Luo, 2007). Organizational antecedents include the 
relative (small) size of a firm, which calls for it to improve its competitive position (Gnyawali 
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and Park, 2009) or asymmetries in firms’ assets, markets, and business foci, which attenuate 
the competitive tension between prospective partners (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). Asymmetries 
in firms’ assets may, for instance, drive their resource interdependence and thus guide their 
motivation to compete versus cooperate with each other. Scholars have also underscored 
various other motivations for engaging in coopetition besides mitigating competitive 
pressure. These include, for example, learning and accessing required resources, entering new 
markets, and reducing uncertainty (Gnyawali, He, and Madhavan, 2008; Gnyawali and Park, 
2009; Luo, 2007). However, most of these motivations have been previously ascribed to the 
formation of horizontal alliances on a broader level and thus fall short of revealing unique 
nuances relating to the interplay of competition and cooperation. Scholars are therefore 
advised to identify factors that shape the balance between competition and cooperation at the 
firm, dyad, and network levels (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014). It might also be interesting to 
investigate the roots of competitive and cooperative behaviors by studying managers’ cultural 
differences, personality traits, and values (e.g., egoism versus altruism), which may also drive 
their firms’ tendencies to compete versus to cooperate. Social ties between managers can also 
influence their competitive behaviors. For instance, friendships among Australian hotel 
executives have been shown to have a material effect on their hotel yields (Ingram and 
Roberts, 2000), while marriages between the families who own chaebols in Korea have 
affected their market entry and exit decisions (Han, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017). 
Research on the consequences of coopetition tends to echo the motivations for 
coopetition by identifying potential outcomes such as resource access and pooling, cost 
sharing, and reduced risk (Bouncken et al., 2015). These benefits can create value that 
ultimately enhances firm performance (Afuah, 2000; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2009). Coopetition can also contribute to various types of innovation, including incremental 
and radical innovation, as well as to the diversity of technologies (e.g., Ritala and 
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Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013; Ritala and Sainio, 2014). However, empirical research has 
produced inconsistent findings, with some studies uncovering negative performance 
implications (e.g., Afuah, 2000). This hints to possible boundary conditions associated with 
the partner firms’ abilities to manage the tension between competition and cooperation. For 
instance, coopetition may foster innovation only when the partners maintain interdependence 
and trust (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2012). It may also inhibit technological or market 
discontinuity that entails greater novelty (Bouncken and Kraus, 2013) or facilitate aggressive 
competitive behavior in certain network structures (Gnyawali et al., 2006). In fact, some 
studies underscore the challenges of managing the tension between competition and 
cooperation (e.g., knowledge leakage, opportunistic behavior, or lack of commitment), which 
can undermine the stability of the alliance and lead to its dissolution (e.g., Gnyawali and 
Park, 2009). Since the interplay of competition and cooperation has the potential both to 
create or destroy value, it is essential to identify boundary conditions that foster favorable 
consequences for the firms involved. Future research might also consider additional 
consequences besides innovation, financial performance, and the survival of alliances and the 
partner firms. It would be worthwhile, for instance, to consider how the interplay of 
competition and cooperation facilitates growth strategies such as diversification and vertical 
integration as well as market entry and strategic positioning via differentiation. Another 
interesting avenue for future research would be to test the performance implications of 
different forms of balance between competition and cooperation.  
Value creation and appropriation is likewise a recurrent theme in research on the 
interplay of competition and cooperation. It has been argued that firms cooperate to create 
value and then compete to capture a share of the joint value created (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996). For instance, a software firm may leverage the financial and marketing 
resources of its alliance partners to create value and then bargain for its share of that value 
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(Lavie, 2007). Similarly, automobile manufacturers may compete fiercely, yet cooperate with 
component suppliers in their respective value chains as part of their keiretsu (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000). Hence, value creation has been typically tied to cooperation, whereas value 
appropriation has been ascribed to competition. But this need not be always the case. In a 
keiretsu, for example, the automobile manufacturers and their component suppliers may 
compete for their share of value created. Interfirm competition can in turn create value by 
motivating rival firms to invest in technology development, enhanced efficiency, or an 
improved value proposition to customers (Chen and Miller, 2015). However, once the 
required investment exceeds the expected value, “Red Queen” competition emerges whereby 
firms fail to create more value by matching their competitors’ investments (Derfus et al., 
2008). In such a case, the created value may be fully captured by customers, suppliers, or 
complementors. Similarly, value appropriation may be tied to cooperation rather than to 
competition. For instance, firms that pool their purchasing orders can enjoy economies of 
scale and capture more value when bargaining with a common supplier. Collusion is another 
form of tacit cooperation that enables firms to coordinate prices and avoid competitive 
pressure, which in turn enable them to capture more value at the expense of their customers 
(Tirole, 1988). These instances illustrate how both competition and cooperation can either 
increase or decrease the value created and appropriated by firms. The valence of that value 
often depends on the nature of the interplay and the relationship between the firms involved. 
Recent research suggests that factors which contribute to value creation in alliances, such as 
complementarities and symmetric governance, also encourage firms to compete more fiercely 
in an effort to capture value from those alliances (Panico, 2017). We encourage scholars to 
sidestep the conventional wisdom in studying the implications of competition and 
cooperation for value creation and appropriation.  
A related theme distinguishes private benefits from common benefits. Common 
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benefits cannot be produced independently and are thus jointly created by the firm and its 
partner in the course of their alliance. In turn, the firm and its partner independently accrue 
private benefits from their collaboration, possibly at the expense of the other party (Khanna et 
al., 1998). In other words, firms can create and capture both private and common benefits but 
these benefits are interrelated. For instance, when a firm seeks private benefits by leveraging 
its partner’s knowledge beyond the scope of their alliance, the partner may restrict knowledge 
exchange and thus reduce the common benefits shared with the firm (Lavie, 2006). Scholars 
should carefully study how competitive and cooperative behaviors influence the 
configuration of common and private benefits in alliances, and how the two types of benefits 
are interrelated. The disparity between common and private benefits illustrates a fundamental 
tradeoff between competition and cooperation. Firms often face the challenge of reconciling 
the conflicting behaviors associated with them.  
Managing the tension between competition and cooperation 
The tension between competition and cooperation arises because of the inherent tradeoffs 
between these activities. These tradeoffs emerge because competition and cooperation call for 
conflicting corporate behaviors. In particular, cooperation entails sharing and exchanging 
resources with a partner, whereas competition calls for protecting such assets and restricting 
undesirable knowledge leakage that can benefit a competitor (Kale et al., 2000). Cooperation 
facilitates alignment of objectives and coordination of activities, whereas competition 
encourages firms to pursue their private agendas and can elicit free riding and opportunistic 
behavior (Khanna et al., 1998). Indeed, research on coopetition suggests that competitive 
dynamics restrict partners’ commitments in alliances and lead to unstable relationships that 
may be terminated prematurely (Gnyawali and Park, 2009). Reconciling these conflicting 
motivations and managing their inherent contradictions is far from trivial. A paradox emerges 
because competition and cooperation are contradictory, yet firms often engage in both types 
20 
 
of interactions in order to achieve desirable outcomes. A resolution involves relaxing this 
tension by buffering competition from cooperation (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989) so that a 
firm can restrict its concurrent engagement in competition and cooperation or pursue the two 
in separate domains or via separate organizational units. Alternatively, the firm may seek to 
develop capabilities and routines that support concurrent competition and cooperation with 
the same counterparts.  
 One approach to managing the tension between competition and cooperation involves 
the organizational separation of the corresponding activities. Such separation is 
straightforward in a multidivisional firm: one organizational unit cooperates with a partner 
firm while another competes with it. Although this separation can attenuate the tension, it 
requires coordination across units to align corporate objectives and prevent exploitation of the 
cooperating unit by the partner. Organizational separation is also possible within the same 
organizational unit as long as the firm assigns different managers to the cooperative and 
competitive engagements, installs organizational buffers such as computer firewalls, and 
establishes clear procedures for maintaining separation between the engagements (Lavie and 
Singh, 2012). This approach requires either a high level of trust between the firm and the 
partner or a social sanction mechanism as well as a delicate organizational design.  
 A second approach to coping with this tension is temporal separation, whereby the 
firm oscillates between competition and cooperation over time, with the aim of restricting the 
time periods during which it competes and cooperates simultaneously with the same partner. 
The shorter the overlap periods and the longer the periods of pure competition or cooperation, 
the weaker the expected tension. However, the frequency of transitions may leave room for 
strategic behavior, whereby the partner leverages the collaboration to learn and improve its 
competitive position in anticipation of the period of competition. This approach is not free 
from organizational challenges, given the need to manage the transitions and frequently 
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modify strategic behavior while overcoming path dependencies and inertial routines.  
 A third approach to managing the tension involves a domain separation in which the 
firms engage in simultaneous competition and cooperation yet these activities take place in 
different domains (e.g., product lines, geographical markets, or value chain activities). For 
instance, firms may cooperate in preliminary R&D yet compete in product development and 
the marketing of their competing products (e.g., Sakakibara, 2002). Such separation can 
reduce the tension as long as the interdependence between domains is minimal. However, to 
the extent that products are complementary, intangible, or foster economies of scope, the 
separation may be partial and thus leave room for strategic behavior, for instance, when a 
firm favors product components developed internally over those furnished by its partner. 
Given the above, it would therefore seem that each solution which entails separation only 
transforms the tension between competition and cooperation, while still requiring some 
integration or coordination across boundaries.  
 A final approach to managing the tension between competition and cooperation 
involves maintaining contextual integration by embracing the paradoxical nature of these 
contradictory activities and developing appropriate mechanisms and organizational routines 
to manage them simultaneously within the same organizational unit. This often involves the 
synthesis of competition and cooperation by means of differentiation and integration by unit 
managers (Schad et al., 2016). This approach is however likely to be cognitively and 
administratively taxing. It requires careful delineation of the knowledge that a firm is willing 
to share with a partner under certain circumstances as well as the devising of isolating 
mechanisms and particular means for protecting its remaining proprietary knowledge (Kale et 
al., 2000). Firms that follow this approach might hire employees who can cope with the 
uncertainty and complexity of these ambivalent relationships while nurturing the mutual trust, 
commitment, and conflict resolution mechanisms that are required to manage the unavoidable 
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tension in the firms’ relations. Indeed, scholars have indicated that such an approach entails 
the adopting of a coopetitive mindset or integrative framing and leveraging of relevant 
managerial experience, while ensuring availability of complementary assets that generate 
potential benefits which can offset the risks of coopetition (Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Stadtler 
and Van Wassenhove, 2016).  
 Despite some preliminary qualitative research (e.g., Gnyawali and Park, 2011) and 
efforts to reconceptualize the paradoxical relationship between competition and cooperation 
(Chen, 2008; Chen and Miller, 2015), little is known about firms’ approaches to managing 
the tension between competition and cooperation. The tradeoffs between these activities can 
be transformed and managed, but not eliminated, unless competition and cooperation are 
viewed as interdependent. Scholars should therefore delve more into the aforementioned 
approaches and assess their effectiveness. When would a firm opt for one approach over the 
other? Which approach is most effective, and under what circumstances? How can firms 
implement each approach, and what are the implications for alliance management and 
governance? What are the consequences of having partner firms pursue distinct approaches in 
their joint relationship? How can firms combine different approaches such as contextual 
integration and temporal separation? These are just some of the open questions concerning 
the management of the interplay of competition and cooperation.  
Our roadmap setting out this research agenda is summarized in Figure 1. Table 1 lists 
some of the promising questions for future research. In the next section, we will discuss the 
articles included in this special issue. These articles make some strides in addressing the 
questions that we raise yet leave promising research opportunities for future scholarship. Our 
hope is that these ideas and the contributions of the articles in this special issue will advance 
this important discussion on the ways in which scholars can bring together these two pillars 
of research in strategic management.  
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***Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here*** 
OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLES IN THE SPECIAL ISSUE 
This special issue includes nine thought-inspiring articles, two of which are theoretical and 
seven of which are empirical. Of the latter, two draw on qualitative and five rely on 
quantitative research methods. This diversity indicates that the interplay of competition and 
cooperation can be studied using different lenses and analytical approaches, each providing a 
unique perspective on this interesting phenomenon. Although the articles in this special issue 
can be assigned to multiple categories in our proposed Roadmap for the Interplay of 
Competition and Cooperation (Figure 1), the following overview maps each of these studies 
to the most salient category. Together, these articles cover certain aspects of the themes in 
this special issue, including the antecedents of the interplay, the nature of the interplay, the 
management of the tension and its consequences, as well as the broader implications of the 
interplay of competition and cooperation. Nevertheless, they also leave room for future 
research, as they only partially address the themes that are evident in the roadmap.   
Antecedents of the interplay 
Two of the studies described in the articles underscore the antecedents of the interplay 
between cooperation and competition, revealing new insights into the rationale or motivation 
of firms to cooperate with competitors. The theoretical article, “Discontinuities, Competition, 
and Cooperation: Coopetitive Dynamics between Incumbents and Entrants” by Cozzolino 
and Rothaermel examines environmental and organizational antecedents of coopetition 
between new entrants and incumbent firms in the form of complementary asset 
discontinuities. These are technological changes that do not devalue incumbents’ upstream 
core knowledge but rather their downstream complementary assets in manufacturing and 
distribution. The authors examine how different types of technological discontinuities affect 
competition and collaboration in an industry when the discontinuity induces cooperation 
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between incumbents and new entrants. They also theorize on why firms actually compete and 
cooperate following a discontinuity. Cozzolino and Rothaermel posit that the strength of the 
appropriability regime determines the form of incumbent-new entrant interaction: when the 
appropriability regime is weak, incumbents are likely to acquire new entrants, whereas when 
the regime is strong, incumbents ally with new entrants. Furthermore, following 
complementary-asset discontinuities, incumbents are expected to cooperate amongst 
themselves as well as with new entrants that bring new complementary assets. Organizational 
characteristics also play an important role: high status incumbents are more likely to work 
with one another, while low status incumbents are more likely to partner with the high-status 
new entrants. The article also considers how coopetition between firms changes over time, 
especially how it moves from dyadic interactions to the development of platforms and 
ecosystems through the changes in the firms’ identities.  
In their empirical article, “An Identity Perspective on Coopetition in the Craft Beer 
Industry,” Blake, Frid, Galloway, and Huyghe use an inductive field study to examine the 
organizational antecedents of coopetition. The authors use the notion of organizational 
identity as a mechanism that makes the firm determine the appropriate balance between 
cooperation and competition. Identity can be considered an organizational antecedent of 
coopetition, while collective norms, another mechanism in their study, represents a 
motivational antecedent to coopetition. The unit of analysis is the firm, but the insights can be 
aggregated to the level of a category that loosely resembles a strategic group in an industry. 
Cooperation between incumbents and new entrants is favored over competition when 
members of one category, e.g. craft breweries, develop an oppositional identity to members 
of another category, e.g. industrial breweries, and when there is a shared belief that the rising 
tide lifts all boats and that advice should be paid forward among the category members. 
Under these conditions, tensions between competition and cooperation within the category 
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are reduced. For example, collaborating partners exchange knowledge, reduce their 
probability of opportunistic behavior, increase their commitment to the others, and build 
more stable relationships. This leads to a higher probability that the collaborating firms will 
survive and a more stable emergence of a craft brewery category. Hence, this study informs 
us not only about the antecedents of the interplay but also about the means by which firms 
can mitigate the tensions between competition and cooperation.  
The nature of competition and cooperation 
One of the articles in this special issue sheds new light on the nature of competition and 
cooperation and its implications for their interplay. In “Attacking Your Partners: Strategic 
Alliances and Competition between Partners in Product Markets”, Yang, Cui, and Vertinsky 
look at the explicit nature of this interplay. They integrate alliance learning and social 
network perspectives to examine how the nature of a firm’s alliances affects its propensity to 
compete with its partners. The authors focus on relative exploration, defined as the proportion 
of exploratory alliances in the collaborative portfolio between a firm and its partner. In a 
dataset from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry collected over 20 years, the authors find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between relative exploration in a dyad and competition 
between its members. This is because initial increases in the relative exploration incentivize 
both firms to behave opportunistically due to the temptations to exploit private benefits. As 
the relative exploration in a dyad increases beyond a certain point, the space for new 
discovery increases, and the interests of dyad members become more aligned. Hence, their 
propensity for competition declines. Alternative governance mechanisms in the form of 
relational and structural embeddedness reduce dyad members’ propensity to convert increases 
in their relative exploration into competition, while the power imbalance in a dyad increases 
this propensity. In other words, the impact of relative exploration on competition is 
dampened by the strength of the partners’ ties and by the presence of common partners but 
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augmented by differences in the firms’ degree centrality. The study highlights the continuous 
nature of coopetition as firms continuously experience a tradeoff between relative exploration 
in their alliances and the intensity of competition, which is in turn moderated by the nature of 
their embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).  
Nature of the interplay and related tensions  
Three articles in this special issue concentrate on various aspects of the interplay of 
competition and cooperation. A theory article “The Relational View Revisited: A Dynamic 
Perspective on Value Creation and Value Capture” by Hesterly, Dyer, and Singh extends the 
original formulation of the relational view by Dyer and Singh’s (1998). This proposed four 
determinants of value creation and rents in alliances: complementary resources and 
capabilities, relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, and effective governance. 
The new article examines how cooperation and competition within relationships unfold over 
time. In this revisited formulation of the relational view, complementary resources provide 
potential for value creation and represent a state variable, whilst relation-specific assets, 
knowledge-sharing routines, and effective governance are instrumental in realizing this 
potential. Interdependence between complementary partner resources influences relationship-
specific investments, governance mechanisms, and knowledge sharing. This article advances 
several propositions that can explain prior inconsistent findings in articles which built on the 
relational view. For example, when interdependence between the complementary resources of 
alliance partners is low, relational value creation over time might follow an inverted U-
shaped pattern. Low interdependence implies that partners can quickly assemble the alliance 
to take advantage of the available opportunity and disassemble it once the opportunity is 
gone. Yet when interdependence between the complementary resources of alliance partners is 
high, value creation over time might follow an S-shaped pattern because high 
interdependence alliances are difficult to decompose. Once the initial opportunity for value 
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creation has been exploited, and the alliance shows signs of strain, the partners will invest in 
building appropriate governance and knowledge sharing mechanisms to sustain value 
creation. With respect to private and common benefits, the authors propose that the increase 
in investments for replicating a partner’s knowledge and resources will increase the 
percentage of the subsequent value that the focal firm can generate in the alliance. Ultimately, 
this article focuses on the nature of the interplay between competition and cooperation, 
highlights the resulting tension in the form of learning races or imbalance in making relation-
specific investments, examines the consequences of this tension in the form of the split 
between common and private benefits, and links them to the implications of coopetition for 
relational rents and value creation. 
An inductive field study is also used in the article “How Firms Navigate Cooperation 
and Competition in Nascent Ecosystems”. In this study, Hannah and Eisenhardt identify three 
strategies for competing in ecosystems: bottleneck, component, and system. Like Hesterly et 
al. (this issue), Hannah and Eisenhardt focus on the nature of the interplay between 
competition and cooperation. Companies following a component strategy focus their efforts 
on developing specific components in an ecosystem and cooperate with others to gain access 
to other components. A system strategy implies that a firm spreads its efforts across multiple 
components in its ecosystem. Finally, a bottleneck strategy implies that the firm focuses on a 
critical component of the ecosystem that hinders its growth at a given point in time. When 
that bottleneck changes as the ecosystem matures, the firm’s focus changes as well. While the 
component strategy implies cooperation as the firm’s dominant strategy, and the system 
strategy suggests competition as the dominant strategy, the firms that follow bottleneck 
strategy have to find a balance between cooperation and competition. The key finding in this 
in-depth multiple-case study of the solar industry in the United States is that firms succeed 
when they address a bottleneck and cooperate to assemble the entire ecosystem. Such firms 
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must compete with other ecosystem members through the growth of their market power. 
They must also engage in coopetition even if they address the bottleneck: focusing solely on 
cooperation or competition is insufficient. Hence, this study demonstrates that in nascent 
industries coopetition is a necessary but insufficient condition for superior performance: 
Firms must instead combine coopetition with a bottleneck strategy to succeed.  
Similar to Hannah and Eisenhardt’s study, Ranganathan, Ghosh, and Rosenkopf also 
explore how firms compete in ecosystems in their article “Competition-Cooperation Interplay 
During Multi-Firm Technology Coordination: The Effect of Firm Heterogeneity on Conflict 
and Consensus in a Technology Standards Organization”. The authors theorize about the 
firm-level antecedents of competitive tensions within these organizations by examining how 
competitive tensions and cooperative motivations affect firms’ technology coordination 
activities. In their empirical study of firms’ voting patterns in a technology standards-setting 
organization over a 14-year period, the authors find that when firms end up in competitive 
markets, they exhibit greater support for the common standards therein. However, when they 
possess a broad array of complementary products, i.e. experience a lower intensity of 
competition, their support for specific standards is tempered. Furthermore, Ranganathan et al. 
show that firms with greater multi-party experience are more likely to achieve consensus in 
standards negotiations. This echoes the finding of Blake et al. (this issue) that denser 
embeddedness within a nascent category increases the firm’s propensity to collaborate with 
others in that category. Ultimately, Ranganathan et al. illustrate how multilateral interplay of 
competition and cooperation affects the tension between commitment and opportunism, 
which in turn affects the interplay between a firm’s value creation and appropriation from 
setting technological standards. 
Consequences and implications of the interplay 
Several articles focus on the consequences and implications of the interplay of competition 
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and cooperation. In “The Interplay of Competitive and Cooperative Behavior and Differential 
Benefits in Alliances”, Arslan builds on a transaction costs perspective and game theory to 
offer a systematic study of the tradeoffs between private and common benefits in alliances 
(Khanna et al., 1998) as the consequences of coopetition. Arslan suggests that opportunistic 
behavior for private benefit extraction can have detrimental effects on the parties’ ability to 
realize common benefits. This can result from the underinvestment of resources, the 
overprotection of proprietary resources, or from retaliation in an alliance. The unit of analysis 
here is the dyad. This study empirically evaluates differential benefits in alliances that accrue 
to partners at the time of alliance announcement. It also highlights the fact that the partners’ 
competitive behaviors inhibit realization of the common benefit potential of their alliance, 
thus making private benefits extraction conditional upon their competitive behaviors. The 
variables of interest are the common benefit potential of the alliance, the balance of the 
distribution of the common benefits, task interdependence of alliance partners, and the 
dominant operational control. Like Cozzolino and Rothaermel (this issue), Arslan explores 
the environmental antecedent of coopetition (in the form of alliance industry profitability) as 
well as the organizational antecedent (in the form of CEO appointments) as an indicator of 
dominant operational control in an alliance. The key finding is that a partner can obtain high 
differential benefits from the alliance, operationalized as the abnormal stock market return, 
when it holds a dominant operational control in a collaboration characterized by either 
reciprocal or sequential interdependence. This study clearly highlights the tensions between 
common versus private benefits that are inherent in any coopetitive relationship and their 
implications for the partners’ stock market performance.  
 In “Performance Feedback as a Cooperation ‘Switch’: A Behavioral Perspective on 
the Success of Venture Capital Syndicates Among Competitors”, Makarevich examines the 
organizational antecedents as well as the performance implications of coopetition. The study 
30 
 
described in this article draws on performance feedback theory (e.g. Shipilov, Li, and Greve, 
2011) to advance a behavioral perspective on the implications of coopetition in the venture 
capital syndicates context. Such syndicates represent an example of cooperation among 
funders who are also rivals in deals through their investments in competing start-ups. The 
syndicate represents a multi-party level of analysis. The key performance indicator for a 
venture capital (VC) syndicate is the probability of taking a new venture to an initial public 
offering (IPO) stage. The higher the competition amongst VCs in a syndicate, the lower the 
probability of an IPO. When syndicate members underperform their aspirations, they have a 
better chance of an IPO than in syndicates whose firms outperform their aspirations. This 
effect is stronger when there is an alignment of syndicate members’ motivations, i.e. when 
the common benefits of collaboration outweigh the private benefits. These insights are 
derived from the analysis of 33 years of data on the performance, history, and social 
aspirations of U.S.-based venture capitalists. 
Complementing Makarevich’s (this issue) study of VC syndicates, Asgari, Tandon, 
Singh, and Mitchell examine another form of a multilateral association, namely alliance 
portfolios (Lavie, 2006; Hoffmann, 2007) in their article “Creating and Taming Discord: 
How Firms Manage Embedded Competition in Alliance Portfolios to Limit Alliance 
Termination.” Their study examines the extent to which competition among a firm’s portfolio 
members leads them to terminate relationships, thus underscoring an implication of 
coopetition. It also proposes four factors that can mitigate termination risks: alliance 
governance, social cohesion of the portfolio, number of paths through which firm resources 
can be transferred in a portfolio, and similarity between the focal firm and its partner. Asgari 
et al.’s analysis of alliances among biopharmaceutical firms between 1990 and 2000 shows 
support for the main hypothesis—competition between a focal firm’s partners does indeed 
increase the propensity of alliance termination with any one of these partners. However, these 
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effects are dampened by the similarity between the focal firm and its partner as well as by the 
number of paths through which resources are transferred within the portfolio. In other words, 
when the salience of the focal firm as a conduit of resource loss is low, and when it can help 
its partner to recognize and address collaboration challenges, the latter is less likely to 
terminate the alliance despite competition within the firm’s portfolio. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the articles in this special issue make important strides in uncovering 
some previously unexplored facets of the interplay of competition and cooperation, in line 
with our proposed roadmap (Figure 1). We believe that this special issue paves the way for 
further examination of the various ways in which competition and cooperation can interplay. 
Given the centrality of these concepts to strategic management and the limited integration of 
the corresponding research streams to date, it also sets an exciting and important research 
agenda for the field.  
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Table 1: Promising Themes and Directions for Future Research 
Theme 1: Antecedents, processes, and consequences of cooperating with competitors 
- How do organizational, environmental, and managerial factors drive coopetition?  
- How do industry conditions and firms’ resource configurations shape coopetition? 
- Should firms simultaneously cooperate and compete or should they specialize by 
separating their partners from their competitors?  
- How can firms mitigate the risks of coopetitors’ opportunistic behavior? 
- How do interfirm trust, joint governance, and routines emerge in coopetitive relations? 
- What are the various facets of coopetition and their respective performance implications?  
- How does cooperation affect firms’ competitive positions? 
Theme 2: Value creation and appropriation 
- How do firms simultaneously manage value creation and appropriation in their relations?  
- What are the tradeoffs and challenges that firms encounter due to simultaneous 
competition and cooperation? 
Theme 3: Temporal dimension 
- How do competition and cooperation coevolve at different levels?  
- How does competition elicit cooperation?  
- How and why do alliance partners begin to compete? 
- How do alliances formed between competitors differ from those between partners who 
subsequently become competitors? 
Theme 4: Capabilities and organization for supporting coopetition 
- What are the elements of a coopetition capability?  
- How does a coopetition capability differ from an alliance management capability?  
- How is a coopetition capability developed and institutionalized?  
- How does the alignment of the coopetition capabilities of partners shape performance? 
Theme 5: Applying methods for studying cooperation and competition networks 
- How do competition networks shape cooperation networks and vice versa?  
- How does the interplay of competition networks and cooperation networks shape firm 
performance and drive industry entry and exit?  
- How do competitors of a firm’s partners or partners of a firm’s competitors influence its 
strategy and performance? 
Theme 6: Approaches for managing the tension between competition and cooperation 
- What are the approaches for managing the tension between competition and cooperation? 
- When should a firm opt for one approach over the other?  
- Which approach is most effective, and under what circumstances?  
- How can firms implement each approach?  
- What are the consequences of having partner firms pursue distinct approaches? 
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Figure 1: A Preliminary Roadmap for the Interplay of Competition and Cooperation 
 
